I knew there was a reason I don’t really like these things:
One of the key themes emerging from the study, as well as from earlier research into reading behavior, is that people in general and students in particular read in a variety of ways. Sometimes they immerse themselves in a text, reading without interruption. Sometimes they skim a text to get a quick sense of the content or the argument. Sometimes they search a text for a particular piece of information or a particular topic. Sometimes they skip back and forth between two or more sections of a text, making comparisons. And sometimes they take notes, make marginal annotations, or highlight passages as they read. Reading is, moreover, a deeply personal, highly idiosyncratic activity, subject to all kinds of individual quirks. Every reader is unique.
Because we’ve come to take printed books for granted, we tend to overlook their enormous flexibility as reading instruments. It’s easy to flip through the pages of a physical book, forward and backward. It’s easy to jump quickly between widely separated sections, marking your place with your thumb or a stray bit of paper or even a hair plucked from your head (yes, I believe I’ve done that). You can write anywhere and in any form on any page of a book, using pen or pencil or highlighter or the tip of a burnt match (ditto). You can dog-ear pages or fold them in half or rip them out. You can keep many different books open simultaneously, dipping in and out of them to gather related information. And when you just want to read, the tranquility of a printed book provides a natural shield against distraction. Despite being low-tech – or maybe because of it – printed books and other paper documents support all sorts of reading techniques, they make it easy to shift seamlessly between those techniques, and they’re amenable to personal idiosyncrasies and eccentricities.
E-books are much more rigid. Refreshing discrete pages of text on a fixed screen is a far different, and far less flexible, process than flipping through pliant pages of fixed text. By necessity, a screen-based, software-powered reading device imposes navigational protocols and routines on the user, allowing certain patterns of use but preventing or hindering others. All sorts of modes of navigation and reading that are easy with printed books become more difficult with electronic books – and even a small degree of added difficulty will quickly frustrate a reader. Whereas a printed book adapts readily to whoever is holding it, an e-book requires the reader to adapt to it.
I can imagine that the e-book readers will end up being integrated as just another tool among the many others that students and others will end up using. Certainly when the number of books and papers you need to consult rises above one, an e-book reader becomes just another information provision artifact (and paper has worked well for rather a long time!).
The researchers provide an illuminating case study showing how important cognitive mapping can be:
[One student] used kinesthetic cues such as folded page corners and the tangible weight of the printed book to help him locate content quickly. He told us that “after I’ve spent some time with the physical book, I know … exactly how to open it to the right page. … I kind of visually can see where I am in the book.” His physical experience with the text changed dramatically when he began using his Kindle DX: He lost these kinesthetic cues and spent much more time hunting for information than he had previously done. He stopped using the Kindle DX for his assigned academic readings because he wanted to remain as productive and efficient as he was before he received his Kindle DX.
Actual empirical evidence on alternate pedagogical methods is important!
[This is the fifth in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
The crime debate in the UK was dominated by the phrase ‘short, sharp, shock’, which relied on the folk theory that quick and severe punishment would shock teenagers out of criminal tendencies. (The pleasing alliteration of the successive sibilants was an important, but useless, selling point too). Short, sharp shocks, of course, predictably have no such effect, but why let data from the psychology of punishment and from criminology influence debate?
The phrase ‘cut and run’ was used to forestall debate about the palpably-failing US military strategy in Iraq, until empirical reality forced a change of direction.
The debate in Ireland over privatisation uses phrases designed to prevent discussion, such as ‘selling off the family silver ware’* or, much less analytically, that privatisation is ‘stupid’ (Ex-Minister Ryan). Who wants to be stupid? O course silver plates aren’t much good if you don’t have the food to eat from them. In the UK, the privatisation debate is about how a ‘war chest’ can be created for stimulus purposes. The consequences of the language used about privatisation frames very different outcomes. Unless one believes that the current configuration of Government ownership of assets is exactly optimal (an unfalsifiable position), then privatisation is reasonable to consider. It is our capital after all, and can be used to solve problems. By some estimates, the ESB is worth about €7.5 B**; there are perhaps 750,000 mortgages in the country. Privatisation would allow the quick writing down of these mortgages by €100,000 a piece, relieving enormous and growing distress, and giving the banks additional working capital to relieve other logjams in the economy. I am sure there are a thousand good reasons why this policy can’t be enacted, but there are 750,000 reasons why it could. And it is our money anyway, isn’t it?!
*This remark is in comment # 1, not the article itself, which makes a good argument against privatisations. However, things have changed a bit since August 3rd.
**I can’t find where I read this estimate, but there are relevant numbers here.
[This is the fourth in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
Verificationism (also known as confirmation bias) is a pervasive cognitive error, where evidence favouring a particular point of view is collected and weighted heavily, and contrary evidence is discounted or ignored. House prices have been rising for years; therefore, they will continue to rise, so property is a safe-bet investment. Its opposite, falsificationism, is a difficult habit of mind to acquire. It is a must for any working scientist. Falsificationism requires considering what empirical evidence would invalidate (falsify) the position you are adopting. It seems, for example, that no amount of empirical evidence will convince the Labour Party that free fees do not increase access to third-level education (under-privileged students did not pay fees anyway!). Instead, just about all of the empirical evidence shows that to increase access, among other things, you need to intervene as early as is possible (from the pre-school level, and sustain this intervention through all of the school years). There are other variables too, from mentoring, to third-level institution-under-priviliged school relationships, etc. Cherry-picked anecdotes from a taxi-driver (former Minister Breathnach) are not evidence. One way of avoiding this bias is to state clearly what empirical evidence would falsify your opinion; another is to build an evidence-based brake into policy formation. In science this is done by international, anonymous, expert ‘peer review’. Peer-review and similar systems can be built into the process of Government. The terrible fiscal policy errors of the past ten years would likely have been detected if a properly-appointed and supported independent Fiscal Council had the job of publically peer-reviewing proposed Government policy. The mess which has torn up the corporate memory of Government departments (decentralisation) would not have made it out of Charlie McCreevy’s office had robust evidence-based policy tests been in place. The arguments for decentralisation pivoted on the focusing illusion, a cognitive error which emphasises only upside arguments (local benefits: ‘Welcome to Parlon country’ indeed!), but ignores costs (the wholesale destruction of corporate memory and procedure within departments). The whole country knew it was a boondoggle, but reversing policy mistakes of this scale and magnitude is very difficult indeed. Indeed, the whole debate about public sector efficiencies (the Croke Park Agreement) could usefully focus on the deadweight effects of appalling Government policy decisions, and figuring out how to reverse them.
[This is the second in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
The iron law of institutions is the name given to the concern of people who have power in institutions to preserve their power within that institution (even when the institution is failing), rather than being concerned with the success of the institution itself. We have seen this law in action during the recent ructions in Fianna Fáil. Taoiseach Brian Cowen continually asserted as he fell from 52% to 8% in the polls that he was the democratically-elected party leader. Fianna Fáil found itself incapable of terminating (as it fell from 40% to 14% in the polls) his badly-ailing leadership. And this despite the electoral cliff that Fianna Fáil was driving over! Disputes over Brian Cowen’s leadership convulsed Fianna Fáil. There is a substantial literature on successful and unsuccessful leadership. One major review suggests successful leadership requires obeying a few simple precepts. Leaders must be sensitive to their followers, support them, treat them with respect and exceed their expectations; to be positive and inspirational; to work hard and to be seen to work hard for the group; and not be overbearing or arrogant. Which of our leaders, past and present, can tick off these precepts successfully?
Solely focusing on individual leadership and ignoring the situations within which behaviour occurs is known as the fundamental attribution error, and is a cognitive bias caused by the salience of the person, and the relative invisibility of the system (group norms, laws, rules, etc.). The lesson for Irish politics is simple: changing personnel is not enough to solve our problems, because the dysfunctional system itself persists. We need substantial systemic changes too. Political decisions are often (usually?) taken within a group context (think Cabinet collective responsibility). Groupthink occurs when a group makes poor decisions because of high levels of within-group cohesion and a desire to minimise within-group conflict (as might happen in an exhausted, embattled and worn-out Government Cabinet!). The necessary critical analysis does not occur. NAMA would hardly have emerged as the optimal policy response had there been a competitive public forum to test and vet competing policy ideas (with the Cabinet adjudicating). The hugely-criticised ‘Credit Institutions (Stabilization) Act 2010’ (e.g., e.g., e.g., e.g.) would hardly have emerged from such a process. Such a process would show that vesting such astonishing power and authority in the frail, bounded rationality of a single individual (the Minister for Finance) is a recipe for future catastrophe. Groupthink can be reduced by the group having an extensive network of weak ties to other individuals and groups. Weak ties provide us with novel ideas and knowledge, and provide a route to ‘reality-test’ planned courses of action. An extensive national and international weak tie network would provide Government Ministers knowledge, insights and ideas unavailable within the Dáil bubble.
Where did it all go so badly wrong? (Part 1: Anosagnosia, cognitive biases, cognitive diversity, expertise, incompetence)
[This is the first in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
(Figure with apologies and thanks to a variety of similar figures floating around the web)
‘We need to take difficult decisions’ Brian Lenihan
No, we actually need to take much better quality decisions, ones that acknowledge the frailty and error-proneness of human cognition, and which are capable of changing as circumstances change and knowledge evolves
Four times in eighty years (the 1930’s, ‘50’s, ‘80’s and now) the economy has been wrecked. Rightly, there has been plenty of economic analysis (e.g.) of our current problems. There have also been attempts to locate our recurrent problem in the Irish personality (but nations don’t have personalities!), or in dispositions inherited from our colonial past (a novel research area for epigenetics, I suppose). Whatever about the Irish personality, there is no-one in power, and few alive, who remember Ireland as it was pre-1916/1921. We need to look for more proximate causes in the decisions made and executed by our national elites (the administrative, political and commercial classes in charge of the institutions powering the country).
How did our elites get it so spectacularly wrong? A useful way of looking at the problem is to focus on persistent and enduring cognitive biases and errors leading to faulty decision-making by individuals (political leaders, civil servants, bankers, etc.) and institutions (social systems and organisations: Government departments, banks, churches, etc). Looking for proximate causes in pervasive and enduring cognitive errors by individuals and institutions (the social systems within which collective cognition is organised) provides a route to prevent us persisting in correctable mistakes. Happily, we have a guide from more than fifty years of data in experimental psychology and experimental brain research to understand how human rationality and reason is bounded and error-prone. [UPDATE: see note at bottom]
The phrase ‘delusional’ has been used to describe the behaviour of certain members of our elites, but delusions imply the psychiatric diagnosis of pathological beliefs maintained contrary to all evidence. Anosagnosia (a more useful description) is the condition of literally being ‘without knowledge’ (being unaware) of a cognitive or other impairment, and behaving as if there is no problem. This might describe the issues regarding the lack of a regulatory response to capital adequacy in our banks! Additionally, the knowledge and expertise required to solve the problems confronting us is both greater than our elites understand and can acknowledge. This leads to anosagnosia within the cultures of these organisations. Irish elites do not know that they do not know, nor do they even know what they need to know. The figure at top tries to capture this idea. Both the party political system and the civil service systems undervalue expertise and suppress cognitive diversity. Substantial data show that complex and difficult problems (for example, how to rescue a collapsing economy) are best solved by groups with substantial intellectual strength and capacity (obvious), and substantial diversity of experience (not obvious).Truth be told, the problems we are grappling with are beyond the judgement and capacity of the few teachers and the couple of lawyers comprising the bulk of the Cabinet just leaving office. And we still lack (with some exceptions) the high-level policy formation and broad expertise inputs required to support the Cabinet when it has to make crucial decisions.
Our political system is constructed so that the proving ground for national politics is local council politics. This experience leaves politicians good at political manoeuvring and vote-getting, but ill-prepares them for the national game, which ends up reflected through the prism of the local, rather than the national or international. This is why many of our competitor countries deliberately bring extra cognitive diversity into their political systems. Famously, the Cabinet of the US Government has only one elected politician (the President). However, it can field a Nobel Prize in Physics (Secretary of State for Energy, Steven Chu), and world-class economics expertise (Timothy Geithner; Austan Goolsbee). Some have disputed the necessity for some form of national list system because it would have resulted in Sean Fitzpatrick being nominated to the Dáil. (Has this been a conspicuous problem in countries with national list systems?) This is an interesting cognitive error – not exploring counterfactuals to this example, as these would falsify the claim. It is even more possible that many people of capacity and ability are turned off by the system as it currently stands. After all, we have plenty of talent, but it shies away from electoral politics (to all our costs). Such arguments may result from cognitive dissonance (the unpleasant feeling caused by holding two contradictory beliefs simultaneously: for example, “our system isn’t delivering; I and my colleagues are good people and are part of the system; therefore it isn’t the system; the problems lie elsewhere” (with bad bankers, for example, although logically this may also be true!).The potential reduction in available Cabinet slots for non-list constituency candidates because of a list system presumably discommodes some too.
UPDATE: I forgot the Dunning-Kruger effect – a quote from the Wikipedia entry:
The Dunning-Kruger Effect is a cognitive bias in which unskilled people make poor decisions and reach erroneous conclusions, but their incompetence denies them the metacognitive ability to appreciate their mistakes. The unskilled therefore suffer from illusory superiority, rating their ability as above average, much higher than it actually is, while the highly skilled underrate their own abilities, suffering from illusory inferiority. This leads to the situation in which less competent people rate their own ability higher than more competent people. It also explains why actual competence may weaken self-confidence. Competent individuals falsely assume that others have an equivalent understanding. “Thus, the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others.”
Kruger and Dunning proposed that, for a given skill, incompetent people will:
- tend to overestimate their own level of skill;
- fail to recognize genuine skill in others;
- fail to recognize the extremity of their inadequacy;
- recognize and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they can be trained to substantially improve.
Now, who does this remind you of?