Where did it all go so badly wrong? (Part II: Attribution error and leadership)
[This is the second in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
The iron law of institutions is the name given to the concern of people who have power in institutions to preserve their power within that institution (even when the institution is failing), rather than being concerned with the success of the institution itself. We have seen this law in action during the recent ructions in Fianna Fáil. Taoiseach Brian Cowen continually asserted as he fell from 52% to 8% in the polls that he was the democratically-elected party leader. Fianna Fáil found itself incapable of terminating (as it fell from 40% to 14% in the polls) his badly-ailing leadership. And this despite the electoral cliff that Fianna Fáil was driving over! Disputes over Brian Cowen’s leadership convulsed Fianna Fáil. There is a substantial literature on successful and unsuccessful leadership. One major review suggests successful leadership requires obeying a few simple precepts. Leaders must be sensitive to their followers, support them, treat them with respect and exceed their expectations; to be positive and inspirational; to work hard and to be seen to work hard for the group; and not be overbearing or arrogant. Which of our leaders, past and present, can tick off these precepts successfully?
Solely focusing on individual leadership and ignoring the situations within which behaviour occurs is known as the fundamental attribution error, and is a cognitive bias caused by the salience of the person, and the relative invisibility of the system (group norms, laws, rules, etc.). The lesson for Irish politics is simple: changing personnel is not enough to solve our problems, because the dysfunctional system itself persists. We need substantial systemic changes too. Political decisions are often (usually?) taken within a group context (think Cabinet collective responsibility). Groupthink occurs when a group makes poor decisions because of high levels of within-group cohesion and a desire to minimise within-group conflict (as might happen in an exhausted, embattled and worn-out Government Cabinet!). The necessary critical analysis does not occur. NAMA would hardly have emerged as the optimal policy response had there been a competitive public forum to test and vet competing policy ideas (with the Cabinet adjudicating). The hugely-criticised ‘Credit Institutions (Stabilization) Act 2010’ (e.g., e.g., e.g., e.g.) would hardly have emerged from such a process. Such a process would show that vesting such astonishing power and authority in the frail, bounded rationality of a single individual (the Minister for Finance) is a recipe for future catastrophe. Groupthink can be reduced by the group having an extensive network of weak ties to other individuals and groups. Weak ties provide us with novel ideas and knowledge, and provide a route to ‘reality-test’ planned courses of action. An extensive national and international weak tie network would provide Government Ministers knowledge, insights and ideas unavailable within the Dáil bubble.