I’m curating my first ever ‘lab in the gallery’ – details below. Dr Joanne Feeney, a postdoc in my group has been absolutely central to making this even happen, as has the great and creative team in the Science Gallery – Michael John, Rob, Maria, Lynn, Anja, Ian, Derek, Rosa (and John for superb computer programming).
So, think you have a good memory? Are you brave enough to put it to the test at Science Gallery’s MEMORY LAB this March?
FIRE, GOAT, PLUM, SUMP, VANE, HAIR, FARM... How come you can recall your first day at school vividly but won’t remember this list of words when you get to the bottom of this paragraph? Why are some of us memory champions while others have a heads like sieves? Is our ability to remember nature or nurture?
MEMORY LAB, a month-long LAB IN THE GALLERY experience at Science Gallery, Trinity College Dublin, invites the public to take part in a range of real, scientific experiments into how we remember or why we forget.
Eight separate experiments will investigate a range of aspects of functional memory from how good your short-term memory is to how and why we evolved memory in the first place. Be prepared for a barrage of information you will have to recall including numbers, letters, faces and even smells! We’re also inviting people to come and record their earliest ever memory as MEMORY LAB seeks to amass the largest database of earliest memories in the world.
The experimentation begins at Science Gallery on March 11th and continues until April 8th 2011. MEMORY LAB will also contain a rich events programme to allow you explore memory deeper – including a talk by former US Memory Champion and author of “Moonwalking with Einstein: The Art and Science of Remembering Everything” Joshua Foer. Events also include special recruitment event on how to make yourself memorable and Science Gallery’s first ever table quiz where you can put your ability to recall to the test.
MEMORY LAB opens to the public on March 11th and runs until April 8th. The experiments run Tuesday-Friday 12:00-20:00 and Saturday-Sunday 12:00-18:00. Admission free with a suggested donation of €5. You can be the first to experience MEMORY LAB by going to the exclusive preview party on March 10th. All Science Gallery MEMBERS+ go for free (sign up today here) or buy your tickets here.
[This is the fifth in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
The crime debate in the UK was dominated by the phrase ‘short, sharp, shock’, which relied on the folk theory that quick and severe punishment would shock teenagers out of criminal tendencies. (The pleasing alliteration of the successive sibilants was an important, but useless, selling point too). Short, sharp shocks, of course, predictably have no such effect, but why let data from the psychology of punishment and from criminology influence debate?
The phrase ‘cut and run’ was used to forestall debate about the palpably-failing US military strategy in Iraq, until empirical reality forced a change of direction.
The debate in Ireland over privatisation uses phrases designed to prevent discussion, such as ‘selling off the family silver ware’* or, much less analytically, that privatisation is ‘stupid’ (Ex-Minister Ryan). Who wants to be stupid? O course silver plates aren’t much good if you don’t have the food to eat from them. In the UK, the privatisation debate is about how a ‘war chest’ can be created for stimulus purposes. The consequences of the language used about privatisation frames very different outcomes. Unless one believes that the current configuration of Government ownership of assets is exactly optimal (an unfalsifiable position), then privatisation is reasonable to consider. It is our capital after all, and can be used to solve problems. By some estimates, the ESB is worth about €7.5 B**; there are perhaps 750,000 mortgages in the country. Privatisation would allow the quick writing down of these mortgages by €100,000 a piece, relieving enormous and growing distress, and giving the banks additional working capital to relieve other logjams in the economy. I am sure there are a thousand good reasons why this policy can’t be enacted, but there are 750,000 reasons why it could. And it is our money anyway, isn’t it?!
*This remark is in comment # 1, not the article itself, which makes a good argument against privatisations. However, things have changed a bit since August 3rd.
**I can’t find where I read this estimate, but there are relevant numbers here.
[This is the fourth in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
Verificationism (also known as confirmation bias) is a pervasive cognitive error, where evidence favouring a particular point of view is collected and weighted heavily, and contrary evidence is discounted or ignored. House prices have been rising for years; therefore, they will continue to rise, so property is a safe-bet investment. Its opposite, falsificationism, is a difficult habit of mind to acquire. It is a must for any working scientist. Falsificationism requires considering what empirical evidence would invalidate (falsify) the position you are adopting. It seems, for example, that no amount of empirical evidence will convince the Labour Party that free fees do not increase access to third-level education (under-privileged students did not pay fees anyway!). Instead, just about all of the empirical evidence shows that to increase access, among other things, you need to intervene as early as is possible (from the pre-school level, and sustain this intervention through all of the school years). There are other variables too, from mentoring, to third-level institution-under-priviliged school relationships, etc. Cherry-picked anecdotes from a taxi-driver (former Minister Breathnach) are not evidence. One way of avoiding this bias is to state clearly what empirical evidence would falsify your opinion; another is to build an evidence-based brake into policy formation. In science this is done by international, anonymous, expert ‘peer review’. Peer-review and similar systems can be built into the process of Government. The terrible fiscal policy errors of the past ten years would likely have been detected if a properly-appointed and supported independent Fiscal Council had the job of publically peer-reviewing proposed Government policy. The mess which has torn up the corporate memory of Government departments (decentralisation) would not have made it out of Charlie McCreevy’s office had robust evidence-based policy tests been in place. The arguments for decentralisation pivoted on the focusing illusion, a cognitive error which emphasises only upside arguments (local benefits: ‘Welcome to Parlon country’ indeed!), but ignores costs (the wholesale destruction of corporate memory and procedure within departments). The whole country knew it was a boondoggle, but reversing policy mistakes of this scale and magnitude is very difficult indeed. Indeed, the whole debate about public sector efficiencies (the Croke Park Agreement) could usefully focus on the deadweight effects of appalling Government policy decisions, and figuring out how to reverse them.
[This is the second in a series of posts relevant to the all-consuming topic in Ireland at the moment: the fall of the Fianna Fail/Green Party Coalition Government, and the resulting general election to take place on the 25 February 2011. My title approximates a question/comment posed by a guest (I think it was Jim Glennon, the former FF TD) on George Hook’s programme on Newstalk].
The iron law of institutions is the name given to the concern of people who have power in institutions to preserve their power within that institution (even when the institution is failing), rather than being concerned with the success of the institution itself. We have seen this law in action during the recent ructions in Fianna Fáil. Taoiseach Brian Cowen continually asserted as he fell from 52% to 8% in the polls that he was the democratically-elected party leader. Fianna Fáil found itself incapable of terminating (as it fell from 40% to 14% in the polls) his badly-ailing leadership. And this despite the electoral cliff that Fianna Fáil was driving over! Disputes over Brian Cowen’s leadership convulsed Fianna Fáil. There is a substantial literature on successful and unsuccessful leadership. One major review suggests successful leadership requires obeying a few simple precepts. Leaders must be sensitive to their followers, support them, treat them with respect and exceed their expectations; to be positive and inspirational; to work hard and to be seen to work hard for the group; and not be overbearing or arrogant. Which of our leaders, past and present, can tick off these precepts successfully?
Solely focusing on individual leadership and ignoring the situations within which behaviour occurs is known as the fundamental attribution error, and is a cognitive bias caused by the salience of the person, and the relative invisibility of the system (group norms, laws, rules, etc.). The lesson for Irish politics is simple: changing personnel is not enough to solve our problems, because the dysfunctional system itself persists. We need substantial systemic changes too. Political decisions are often (usually?) taken within a group context (think Cabinet collective responsibility). Groupthink occurs when a group makes poor decisions because of high levels of within-group cohesion and a desire to minimise within-group conflict (as might happen in an exhausted, embattled and worn-out Government Cabinet!). The necessary critical analysis does not occur. NAMA would hardly have emerged as the optimal policy response had there been a competitive public forum to test and vet competing policy ideas (with the Cabinet adjudicating). The hugely-criticised ‘Credit Institutions (Stabilization) Act 2010’ (e.g., e.g., e.g., e.g.) would hardly have emerged from such a process. Such a process would show that vesting such astonishing power and authority in the frail, bounded rationality of a single individual (the Minister for Finance) is a recipe for future catastrophe. Groupthink can be reduced by the group having an extensive network of weak ties to other individuals and groups. Weak ties provide us with novel ideas and knowledge, and provide a route to ‘reality-test’ planned courses of action. An extensive national and international weak tie network would provide Government Ministers knowledge, insights and ideas unavailable within the Dáil bubble.